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Introduction
Sri Lanka’s current population is around 21 million people. With 
approximately ten percent of them being Muslims, Islam constitutes the 
third most dominant religion in the country. Muslims mostly concentrate 
in three areas: the coastal areas in the North-East and in and around 
Galle and Colombo. In 2009, 70 percent of Sri Lanka’s Muslims lived 
below the poverty line (one US-Dollar per day) and ten percent lived in 
refugee camps. The present paper aims to briefly sketch the currently 
increasing conflicts between Sri Lankan Muslims and the authoritarian 
Buddhist state before going on to introduce the plurality of Islam(s) on 
the island.
The end of the war in 2009 offered an opportunity for the strongly 
centralised state to recognise the multi-ethnic and poly-religious 
character of the country and to overcome the confinement of nation 
building projects to the Sinhala nation. However, the regime of 
president Mahinda Rajapaksa – with three of his brothers appointed 
Defence Secretary, Minister of Economic Development and Speaker 
of Parliament respectively – failed to adequately address legitimate 
Tamil and Muslim grievances. Furthermore, a dangerous politics of 
Sinhalisation and militarisation motivated by an interpretation of the 
ethnic conflict began to unfold. This was accompanied by a framing of 
the question of minority rights as a terrorist problem to be dealt with in 
the way of the ‘War on Terror’. After the military victory over the Tamils, 
triumphant Buddhist-Sinhalese elements on the extreme right found a 
fresh target for xenophobia in the Muslim community. 
On 12 December 2007, Hassan Ali, General Secretary of the Sri 
Lanka Muslim Congress, left the government along with three party 
members to join the opposition and expressed his frustration with the 
Südasien-Chronik - South Asia Chronicle 3/2013, S. 161-182 © Südasien-Seminar 
der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin ISBN: 978-3-86004-295-3
THOMAS K. GUGLER
162
government’s leaders: “It’s noted with deep regret that a Venerable 
Buddhist monk made a statement recently that the Muslims are not 
citizens of this country; and that we Muslims have to go back to Saudi 
Arabia” (cit. in Farook 2009: 104). A similar attitude to that denounced 
by Hassan Ali appears in Shenali Waduge’s question: 
If Muslims claim to want to live ‘peacefully’ why are they 
undermining this by requesting for laws, practices and customs 
which directly cause conflicts amongst other communities who are 
in the majority when they know that in Muslim majority nations 
non-Muslims have virtually no rights? (Waduge 2013)
“Lankan Muslims must adopt Arabic” was the headline of an article 
authored by M. I. M. Mohideen, the leader of the Muslim Rights 
Organisation, and published in The Sunday Leader on 31 March 2013. 
Sri Lankan Muslims are ethnically diverse – the Malays speaking Malay, 
the Bohras speaking Gujarati, the Memons speaking Kutchi or Urdu – 
but the vast majority being Moor Muslims speaks Tamil, a language that 
is rather problematical on the paradise island. The ethno-nationalist 
war turned the Muslims into a community ‘in between’, sandwiched 
between the Tamil Tigers and the Sinhalese military with both Tamil and 
Sinhala political elites displaying a strong tendency to exclude Muslims 
(McGilvray & Raheem 2007: ix). State actors are suspicious of Muslims 
denying their ‘actual’ Tamil ethnicity for strategic reasons only (Haniffa 
2009: 87) and Tamils feel betrayed by the Muslims due to their striving 
to cooperate with the government.
Sri Lanka suffers currently from growing ethnic tension fed by the 
denial of minority rights and the absence of power sharing. Attacks by 
militant Buddhists led by monks on Muslim religious sites – for example 
damaging the mosques in Anuradhapura in 2011 and Dambulla in 2012 
– and businesses owned by Muslims have increased dramatically. Since 
long, politicised courts have corroded the rule of law – in particular the 
emergency regulations issued under the Public Security Order and the 
1979 Prevention of Terrorism Act override otherwise applicable law – and 
Sri Lanka’s judiciary has failed to protect both constitutional and human 
rights, which has increased ethnic tensions (ICG 2009). Annoyed by a 
number of Supreme Court rulings, the regime of President Rajapaksa 
and his brothers on 8 December 2012 removed “the last remnants of 
judicial independence through the impeachment of the chief justice” 
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Bandaranayake, who has been replaced by the presidential legal advisor 
Mohan Peiris (ICG 2013: i-7). 
International observers interpret this step as a confirmation that there 
will be no credible investigations by the government into allegations of 
war crimes, disappearances and other serious human rights violations, 
such as the military’s shooting at peaceful protesters in Negombo or 
Colombo. There has been an increase of attacks on journalists, including 
the 2009 murder of 
the Sunday Leader’s 
editor Lasantha 
Wickrematunga and 
the 2010 disappearance 
of political cartoonist 
Prageeth Ekneliyagoda. 
Uthayan’s editor 
G n a n a s u n d a r a m 
Kuhanathan and Sunday 
Leader’s editor Fredrica 
Jansz were forced into 
exile in 2012 and the 
investigative journalist 
Faraz Shauketaly (who 
specialised in corruption 
issues) was shot in 
February 2013. 
In order to under-
stand these dynamics of conflict in the current formative post-war years, 
which have strengthened several new religio-political mass movements 
like the Bodu Bala Sena (Buddhist Power Force) fighting new mini-wars 
like the “boycott halal products” campaign (Fig.1), we will start by 
shortly looking at the Tamil issue in general that resulted in the current 
state-supported politics of Sinhalisation and Buddhaisation under mili-
tary occupation in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.
1. Hegemony and Majoritarianism: Sinhalisation, 
Buddhaisation, Militarisation
150,000 soldiers are currently stationed in the North and East of Sri 
Lanka (ICG 2013: 18). The Tamil-majority Northern Province is currently 
Fig. 1: Call for Boycott of Halaal Products.
Source: Facebook 20131
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de facto under military occupation. The situation in the Eastern Province 
is similar: The increasing militarisation is accompanied by processes of 
Sinhalisation: Sinhala signboards are displayed on shops and in public 
spaces; streets and sometimes even villages are renamed from Tamil to 
Sinhala (e.g. Kokachankulam village is now Kolobaswewa); monuments 
of Sinhala war heroes are built; Buddhist temples are erected, even on 
sites of destroyed Hindu temples, with scores of newly installed Buddha 
statues in non-Buddhist regions, supposedly for the use of the Buddhist 
troops; war museums are opened only for Sinhalese people; Sinhalese 
families are resettled; Tamil civil servants are replaced by Sinhalese 
officials; ancient Buddhist sites are ‘discovered’ by the government’s 
archeological department and claims are made on the territory for the 
establishment of new Buddhist monasteries; contracts for development 
projects are given to Southern-based companies employing Sinhalese 
workers instead of local Tamils and so on.
The linguistic Sinhalisation is a convenience for the ten thousands 
of almost entirely Sinhalese soldiers, who cannot read or speak Tamil, 
but frightening for the locals, who mostly cannot read Sinhalese and 
feel that the historically Tamil land is under threat. Muslims also quite 
correctly feel provoked when Buddha statues are now ostentatiously 
erected in front of or nearby mosques, as the religious communities 
traditionally used to keep a respectful distance between their places of 
worship. Even the flag for the Eastern Province has been changed: The 
new flag displays three animals representing the three districts with 
the Ampara district, where Muslims constitute the largest group with 
44 per cent (Census 2012) of the population, being represented by the 
Sinhala lion, which is absurd. Alone in Pottuvil town, Ampara district, 
where about 99 percent of the population is Muslim, the government in 
December 2005 indicated seven places as Buddhist heritage sites and 
threatened the locals in order to make them leave the sacred Buddhist 
land they occupied. There are now new Buddhist sites for worship with 
worshipers being conspicuously absent.
Speaking Tamil, many Muslims in the 1980s considered themselves 
Tamils and supported the Tamil United Liberation Front. Some Muslim 
youths joined the different militant Tamil organisations. Beginning with 
the murder of 13 soldiers by Tamil Tigers and the ensuing government-
sanctioned anti-Tamil riots in the “Black July” of 1983, the separatist 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was at war with the state, 
fighting for a state of its own in the Northern province. In 1990 – when 
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the Indian Peace Keeping Forces withdrew – and after some Muslim 
cadres left the LTTE, the LTTE committed probably its greatest crime by 
forcefully driving around 90,000 Tamil Muslims out of the Tamil state 
area, with several massacres being organised in mosques. 1990 was 
hence a turning point that radically changed Muslim attitudes towards 
the Tamil cause and its dominant organisations (Farook 2009: 121-152). 
In 1995 the LTTE began to set up a de facto state, whose borders 
were later ratified and quasi recognised internationally through the 
February 2002 Norwegian ceasefire agreement. In August 2006 another 
60,000 Muslims were forced to leave Mutur and there were massacres 
of Muslims in Pottuvil (Farook 2009: 344-408). In January 2008 the 
Sri Lanka government abrogated the ceasefire agreement and the war 
came to a bloody end with the fall of the Tamil capital Kilinochchi in 
January 2009. The final massacres of civilians and the Tamil leadership 
continued until May 2009 and about 40,000 civilians were killed just 
during these final five months of the 26-year long war (ICG 2012c: 5). 
Until today, there remain 120,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs), 
460,000 IDPs could return so far (since 2009). 
Now the area is under military rule, the local politicians are practically 
powerless. More than half of the population lives below the poverty 
line, i.e. one US-Dollar per day.2 Over 60 percent of the households 
are food insecure.3 A study conducted in 2009 in Jaffna displayed very 
high rates of trauma-related mental health conditions: seven percent of 
the population suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 22 
percent from depression, 33 percent from anxiety – the rates among 
the displaced people are significantly higher with 13 percent suffering 
from PTSD, 42 percent from depression and 49 percent from anxiety 
(Husain 2011). 
In August 2011 the election commissioners decided to reduce the 
number of parliamentary seats of the Jaffna electoral district. In Jaffna 
alone, the provincial capital, around 50,000 Sinhalese soldiers are 
stationed. The military forcibly registered and photographed Tamils. 
After objections by the Supreme Court this practice continues under 
the terms of a police ordinance, which requires residents to register 
household information with the police – an ordinance not enforced 
in Sinhala areas. Furthermore, “[T]here also continue to be regular 
physical attacks on journalists, students, politicians and other political 
active Tamils in the north, despite – some would say because of – the 
large military presence” (ICG 2012c: 13). 
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In July 2011 two European journalists from Radio Netherlands 
Worldwide were attacked and robbed in Jaffna after being intimidated 
by the police, who told them to leave the province. The military is the final 
authority on virtually all major decisions – fostering fear, tight surveillance 
and an atmosphere of strong physical repression. 
Tamil fishermen for example suffer from additional military registration 
requirements that all do not apply for Sinhalese fishermen. The military 
supports the resettlement of Sinhalese and is building houses instead of 
barracks. The owners of the private land seized by the military sometimes 
do not see any compensation or replacement land and there are massive 
complaints about coerced sales of land. Apart from new army-run 
restaurants and shops the military began to get involved in the tourist 
market: The army established hotels and guesthouses in the occupied 
areas with the air force expanding flights by its commercial wing and the 
navy opening ferry services. The impact of the military was evaluated 
as problematic to such an extent that in October 2011 the UN endorsed 
guidelines that prohibit cooperation and communication between 
international humanitarian agencies or NGOs and military authorities.
The Eastern Province was hit hardest by the tsunami on 26 December 
2004. In the Eastern Province more than 37 percent of the population is 
Muslim (2012 Census). As another 35 percent of the population is Tamil 
Hindu, the region is traditionally discriminated by the central Buddhist 
government in Colombo. The tsunami left around 35,000 people dead in 
Sri Lanka, more than 500,000 were displaced and about 100,000 houses 
were damaged or destroyed. The Muslim community was hence hit worst by 
the tsunami. When the tsunami aid was distributed, the Eastern Province, 
however, was systematically discriminated since the government focused 
on rebuilding the less affected tourist and Sinhalese-majority areas in the 
South first. Although there is enough food for conflict on the table, Muslims 
generally remain calm as they seemingly have gotten used to suffering 
from authoritarian rule during the last three decades of emergencies.
2. Plurality of Islam(s) in Sri Lanka: Moors, Malays, Memons
The Muslim community in Sri Lanka includes three main ethnic groups: i) 
the Moors, ii) Malays, and iii) Indian Muslims like the Memons and Bohras. 
One third of all Muslims in Sri Lanka live in the Eastern Province. Another 
fifth lives in Colombo. Muslims are associated with several Southern 
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coastal towns like Galle, where they dominate industries like the gem 
trade.
2.1. Moors
More than 92 percent of the Muslims of Sri Lanka are Moors, i.e. they 
trace their ancestry to Arabian traders (Hussein 2011: 1-649; 2009: 
345-376). The term Moor is indeed a misnomer and Moors also termed 
themselves Sonahar, from Tamil Sonagar (lit. skt. Yavanar, fig. a native 
of Arabia). The term Moor derives from the Portuguese colonial term 
“Mauro” meaning being of Arab or Moroccan origin. Prakrit texts from 
the 5th century refer to the Arab traders as Yonas (from Sanskrit 
Yavana, lit. Greeks). In Sinhala, Moors are referred to as marakkala 
minisun (lit. “ship-people”). The Sri Lankan Moors are Shafiites (and 
not Malikites like the Moroccans). It is important to note that Arab 
traders were present in Sri Lanka before the advent of Islam in Arabia. 
The early Moors dominated the maritime trade, later established pearl 
fisheries and the gem trade in Sri Lanka. They mixed with Sinhalese and 
Dravidian locals. 
With the fall of Baghdad in 1258 the ties between the Arabs in the 
Middle East and the Arabs in South Asia were severed heavily and Sri 
Lanka’s Arabs had little option but to increase commercial and cultural 
exchanges with the Tamil Muslims of South India (Hussein 2009: 356). 
Until the end of the 19th century their literature was generally in Arabu-
Tamil, i.e. Tamil written in Arabic script. This came to an end with the 
circulation of printed books, which were then produced in Tamil script. 
Most Moors speak Tamil today, but there remains a sense of pride about 
their ancient Arab origin and although they must not be confused with 
the Tamil Muslims, the border has become sometimes fluent.
On a side note, it might be interesting to know that there are probably 
less than 1,000 Kaffirs in Sri Lanka (Hussein 2009: 441-449), i.e. people 
of African origin. The Sinhala term Kapiri resembles the Portuguese term 
Cafre, which derives from Arabic Kafir meaning unbeliever or slave. 
African slaves were introduced on the island by the Portuguese after 
the occupation in 1505 – among the 20,000 soldiers stationed by the 
Portuguese on the coasts were just 1,000 Europeans, the others were 
slave soldiers from South-East Africa and Ethiopia (Mann 2012: 88). 
They are mostly Christians today.
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2.2. Malays
About 40,000 (Census 2011) of the Muslims in Sri Lanka are Malays, 
descendents from Javanese soldiers: 
Sri Lanka’s Malays are largely descended from political exiles 
including nobles and chiefs, soldiers, convicts, and freed slaves 
from the Indonesian archipelago who were brought over to the 
island during the period of the Dutch occupation which lasted 
from 1658-1796. (Hussein 2011: 650).
Malay Muslims today are 
hence mostly found at the 
Southern coast particular 
in Hambantota District and 
in Colombo, in particular in 
Slave Island (Colombo 2). 
Their language is Malay and 
was traditionally written 
in Gundul (similar to the 
Arabic script), which is not 
in use anymore – they now 
use the Roman script. They 
usually refer to themselves 
as Orang Java (people of 
Java), the Moors call them 
Java (Hussein 2009: 387), 
which makes sense if one 
considers that the VOC’s 
(Verenigde Oostindische 
Compagnie, Dutch East India Company) headquarter was in Batavia, 
i.e. Jakarta on Java. Unlike the Moors, the Malays have preserved their 
Mongolo-Polynesian physical type to a large extent. 
Fig. 2: The Malay Military Mosque, Java Lane 
2, Slave Island, Colombo. Source: T. Gugler
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2.3. Indian Muslims
Indian Muslims include Memons, Bohras and Khojas. The Bombay or 
Gujarati Muslim traders are mostly concentrated in Colombo due to 
their professional business interests (McGilvray & Raheem 2007: 6).
2.3.1. Memons
Among the Indian Muslims in Sri 
Lanka, there are about 7,000 
Memons, traders from Gujarat, 
who perform extraordinarily well 
in textile industries – several top 
apparel exporters of the country 
are Memon-owned businesses. The 
vast majority of Memons live in 
Colombo today. In 1870, the first 
Memon arrived in Sri Lanka. This 
was Abdul Rahman who arrived 
in Jaffna (Hussein & Bhoja 2006: 
16). The 1921 census counted 
356 Memons in the country, 316 
of them in Colombo. The number 
of migrants increased dramatically 
with the partition in 1947. Most 
Memons in Sri Lanka are Halai 
Memons, who came from Sindh via 
Halar in Gujarat. 
In 1956, the Memon Association 
of Ceylon (renamed in 2001 as 
Memon Association of Sri Lanka, 
MASL) was founded in Colombo with 
its first office on New Moor Street in 
Hulftsdorp (Colombo) . Since 1988, 
the impressive head office is located 
on Galle Road 320/1 (Fig. 3). MASL’s 
motto is “Unity, Discipline, Service”. The MASL operates its own wedding 
hall, Memon Hall in Kollupitiya and since 1994 runs its own Madrasa, 
Fig. 3: Memon Association of  
Sri Lanka.
Source: T. Gugler
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Faiz-e Raza, that is now 
located together with 
the library at Perakumba 
Place, Wellawatte. In 
2006, 170 male students 
were enrolled, and since 
1999 there is also the 
Memon Ladies Madrasa 
on Hampden Lane, 
Wellawatte, with 130 
students enrolled in 2006 
(Hussein & Bhoja 2006: 
50-51). They also have 
their own Qazi to settle disputes according to the Hanafi school of 
Islamic jurisprudence, and they run their own magazine, The Samachar, 
in English. Memons’ funerals are simple and speedy, taking place usually 
a few hours after death at the Maligawatte Muslim Burial Grounds in 
Colombo. Memons speak mostly Urdu today – a language taught to the 
children in Faiz-e Raza. Apart from religious activities and the numerous 
business seminars, the MASL regularly organises cricket tournaments 
in cooperation with the numerous Memon sports clubs. The principal 
Memon Mosque in Sri Lanka is the Memon Hanafi Mosque, Third Cross 
Street, Pettah, Colombo, which was completed in 1939 (Fig. 4). The 
language of the Friday sermon is Urdu.
2.3.2. Bohras
Bohras and Khojas are Shia Muslims and they number around 3,000 
people in Sri Lanka. Bohras are a sub-sect of Ismaili Shia Islam following 
Syedna Muhammad Burhanuddin (Blank 2001). In Sri Lanka there are 
four Bohra mosques built by Shias of Indian origin. The oldest one is in 
Galle, one in Jaffna, one in Pettah in Colombo and the largest and latest 
one is in Colombo 4. It was established in 2000 and is only accessible to 
Bohras (Fig. 5).
Fig. 4: Memon Hanafi Mosque, Colombo.
Source: T. Gugler
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3. Transnational Islam: Tablighi 
Jamaat and Dawat-e Islami
The Tablighi Jamaat is active in Sri 
Lanka since the late 1950s. Since 1980 
the Tablighi markaz (organisational 
centre) is located in a building at 
Lukmanjee Square, Colombo 14 (Fig. 
6). The picture shows the mosque, 
flanked by the residential housings 
for male travelers on the left – just 
outside of the compound is another 
residence for female travelers.
In recent years, Tablighis have 
faced increased opposition from 
different directions. While some 
Muslim activists agreed to declare 
Tablighis a foreign Wahhabi force, 
the government of Sri Lanka ordered 
the first mass expulsion of Tablighi 
preachers in January 2012, expelling 161 preachers.4 
The most important counter-movement to the Deobandi Tablighi 
Jamaat is the Barelwi missionary movement Dawat-e Islami (Gugler 2011). 
The Faizan-e Madinah 
of Dawat-e Islami in 
Colombo opened in 
2008 on Messenger 
Street (Colombo 12). 
The Faizan-e Madina in 
Colombo is the single 
centre of Dawat-e 
Islami in Sri Lanka. 
The movement’s amir 
(leader), Mawlana Ilyas 
Qadiri Attar, visited 
Sri Lanka twice, in 
1980 for a missionary 
journey and in 1999 to 
visit his sister, who was 
Fig. 5: Bohra Mosque, built in 
2000 in Colombo.
Source: T. Gugler
Fig. 6: Tablighi Markaz, Colombo. 
Source: T. Gugler
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at this time living in Colombo. The ground floor serves as the mosque and 
boys’ madrasa, while the second floor hosts the rooms where the boys 
who study at the madrasa live. They hold – like the Tablighis – a weekly 
ijtima (congregation) on Thursday evenings with Tamil dars (lesson) and 
bayan (clarification) (Fig. 7). Next to the Faizan-e Madina is a shop of the 
Maktabat al-Madina chain selling Dawat-e Islami publications, DVDs and 
devotional paraphernalia. Besides the publications from India (in Tamil) 
and Pakistan (in Urdu), so far 15 publications were translated in Colombo 
into Sinhala – these are printed locally (Fig. 8).
Fig. 7: A 14-year old student of the Madrasat al-Madina giving dars during
the weekly ijtima. Source: T. Gugler
Fig. 8: Shop of the Maktabat al-Madina Chain, Colombo. Source: T. Gugler
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4. Other Mosques in Colombo
Established in 1505, the Colombo 
Grand Mosque is the oldest mosque 
in Colombo and probably the largest 
mosque in Sri Lanka. One floor can 
host 4,500 people. There are three 
floors plus a basement. On Fridays 
up to 20,000 Muslim men come to 
Colombo Grand Mosque to pray. 
The dargah (shrine) of Shaikh 
Usman Walyullah with a mosque is 
located opposite Odel, Slave Island, 
Colombo. Pigeons, a symbol of peace, are being fed in front of the 
dargah (Fig. 10). The green pieces of cloth symbolise wishes placed 
by Muslims. Every piece of cloth contains a coin. Buddhists perform a 
similar practice at their holy sites.
Fig. 10: Dargah of  Shaikh Usman 
Walyullah. Source: T. Gugler
Fig. 11: Dua (invocation) at 
the grave of Shaikh Walyullah. 
Source: T. Gugler
Fig. 9: Colombo Grand Mosque.
Source: T. Gugler
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5. Galle
Galle – pronounced gawl in English and gaarle in Sinhala – is the main 
and the capital city of the Southern Province of Sri Lanka. Its port was 
Sri Lanka’s main port for more than 200 years, transforming Galle into a 
city of traders and travelers. The first specific reference to Galle was left 
by the Muslim traveler Masudi in the 11th century. Ibn Batuta referred 
to Galle as Qali when he visited the city in 1344. And the Time Magazine 
labeled Galle “South Asia’s Latest Boomtown” in its edition from 3rd 
March 2003. Galle’s long-time librarian, Norah Roberts, authored the 
often-cited and highly readable history of the city, “Galle: As Quiet as 
Asleep” (Roberts 1993). Today about 30 percent of the population in 
Galle are Muslims.
The older part of Galle is dominated by the Dutch Galle Fort, which has 
been declared a World Heritage Site by the UNESCO in 1988 (Fig. 12). 
Commenced by the Portuguese in 1588, but mainly built by the Dutch 
after 1663, the Galle fort is the largest remaining fortress in Asia, 
making Galle the best example of a fortified city built by Europeans 
in South and Southeast Asia. Today about 50 percent of the residents 
inside the Galle fort are Muslims. The main mosque in town is the 
beautiful Meera Mosque inside Dutch Galle Fort built in 1909. At the 
Fig. 12: View of Galle Fort. Source: T. Gugler
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very same site there stood a Portuguese cathedral before. The Friday 
sermon is given in Tamil language.
In 1918 the Galle Muslim Cultural Association was established. 
Since 1965 the Galle Muslims Cultural Association (GMCA) is based 
in a building inside the Fort (Fig. 13). The GMCA has branches in 
Washington and the UK. It publishes the magazine “The Young Muslim” 
and organises festivals like Mawlid to celebrate the birthday of Prophet 
Muhammad.
The Bahjathul Ibrahimya or Arabic College in Galle was established in 
1892 and founded by Sir Mohamed Macan Markar’s mother. Sir Mohamed 
Macan Markar (1885-1969) was Senator and Minister of Home Affairs 
from 1931 to 1936. Until today it is managed and entirely financed by the 
Macan Markar family (Roberts 2006: 50). It was the first Arabic College 
in Sri Lanka that issued Mawlani certificates, qualifying the recipients to 
become Arabic/Islamic teachers at private or governmental colleges or 
become the head or kathi (qazi) of a mosque. Its library is the best in 
Sri Lanka for Arabic books. 
Fig. 13: Galle Muslim Cultural Association. Source: T. Gugler
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The Arabic College 
in Galle Dutch Fort 
teaches currently 
about 60 Muslims 
and educates them 
as imams or madrasa 
teachers. The course 
takes eight years. One 
of the seven lecturers 
comes from al-Azhar 
University, Cairo and 
is financed by the 
Egyptian embassy 
(every three years a 
new graduate from 
al-Azhar comes here 
to teach). There is a 
hostel for students to 
board in (Fig. 15).
Fig. 14: Class Room at the Arabic College.
Source: T. Gugler
Fig. 15: Student Hostel of Arabic College. Source: T. Gugler
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Talapitiya Juma Mosque, 
Galle (Fig. 16), is an Ahl-e 
Sunnat mosque. Tablighis 
are not allowed here. The 
mosque is about 200 years 
old. It has three floors and 
hosts about 2,000 Muslim 
men on Fridays. There is no 
space for women.
Juma Qadiriya 
Mosque (Fig. 17) is 
the largest mosque in 
Galle and about 120 
years old. It is located 
in Kandewatta.
The Sufi shrine and 
mosque at Gintota, 
Galle (Fig. 18) contains 
the grave of Shaikh 
Hussain Wali Allah, who 
came from South India 
and died in the 19th 
century.
Fig. 16: Talapitiya Juma Mosque, Galle.
Source: T. Gugler
Fig. 17: Juma Qadiriya Mosque, Galle.
Source: T. Gugler
Fig. 18: Sufi Shrine and 
Mosque at Gintota, Galle.
Source: T. Gugler
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The Mosque in Makuluwa in Galle seems to be one of the oldest in Sri 
Lanka and is said to be 1300 years old. It is connected to the grave of a 
Yemeni Shaikh from the 8th century. (Fig. 20)
Fig. 19: Mosque in Makuluwa, Galle.
Source: T. Gugler
Fig. 20: Grave of a Yemeni 
Shaikh. Source: T. Gugler
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Conclusion
This brief micro-view on lived Islam in 
contemporary Sri Lanka is enough to 
indicate that Muslims have a broad, 
mixed and vivid distinctive culture 
with an impressively long history in 
the country. Just as in Europe the 
Islam ‘issue’ in Sri Lanka today seems 
to be a fundamental test for the 
state with regards to granting equal 
rights, freedom and recognition to 
all its citizens. In the case of Europe, 
however, political and legal systems 
gradually adapt to and increasingly 
recognise the relatively new presence 
of Muslims. In the case of Sri Lanka, 
in contrast, the political dynamics 
are moving in the opposite direction, 
reifying a more and more Buddhist 
and Sinhala vision of the state with 
an understanding of democracy that 
is dictated by the majority. In the foreseeable future the potential for 
more conflict in Sri Lanka is hence increasing dramatically. And yet, 
there are people full of hope, like 26-year old fashion designer Kareem, 
who converted to Islam from Buddhism two years ago “because Islam 
is so much more free!”
Fig. 21: Kareem. Source: T. Gugler
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Endnotes
1 Anonymous. n.d. Say No to Halaal. https://www.facebook.com/
SayNoToHalaal [retrieved: 12.06.2013].
2 United Nations World Food Programme et al. 2011. Food 
Security in the Northern, Eastern and North Central Provinces: 
A Food Security Assessment Report – Sri Lanka, p. 13, 
http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/
ena/wfp243519.pdf [retrieved 13.05.2013]
3 Ibid.: 80
4 Anonymous. 2012. Sri Lanka ‘expels 161 foreign Muslim 
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